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AN AMERICAN SHARE ECONOMY
KRISTIN E. TOMONTO*
INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, Americans have faced unemployment
levels unparalleled since the Depression, rapidly fluctuating
inflation rates that distort the real value of money, and an
economic stagnation that has crippled many industries.' For
much of this decade, these three problems have existed si-
multaneously, threatening the American economy with a new
dilemma, stagflation.2 Attempts by policymakers to control
these factors using traditional means has resulted in mixed
success.' At the present time, the level of inflation has
* B.B.A. 1983, University of Miami; J.D. 1987, University of No-
tre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1985-1987.
1. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS, INC., 40 THE HANDBOOK OF
BASIC ECONOMIC STATISTICS, Jan. 1986, at 12-13; A. BURNS, THE PERILS OF
INFLATION I (American Enterprise Institute Reprint No. 110, March 1980);
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986, at 406, 466, 477, 752 (106 ed. 1985);
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS DECEMBER 1984, at
17. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1982 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK
FOR 200 INDUSTRIES WITH PROJECTIONS FOR 1986, at 1-24, 242-253.
2. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 769 (11 th ed. 1980). Economists have
suggested several causes for the development of this unique combination.
Some economists attribute this problem to inconsistencies in the competi-
tive market system. In a perfect competitive model, unemployment (the ex-
cess supply of labor) should cause the price of labor to drop until the sup-
ply equals the demand. Thus, competition should force wages to drop to a
level where all laborers are employed. G. HABERLER, THE PROBLEM OF STAG-
FLATION REFLECTIONS ON THE MICROFOUNDATION OF MACROECONOMIC THE-
ORY AND POLICY 9-10 (1985). Other economists think that wages are sticky
and will respond slowly, if at all, to market pressures to decrease to a lower
level. They suggest this market pressure has been counterbalanced by la-
bor's demands to increase wages. As the price index continues to advance,
labor, seeking wages which meet their expectations in an inflationary econ-
omy, demands higher wages. Businesses faced with higher wage costs raise
prices, thus increasing expectations and inflation in the economy. Many
economists suggest the inflation caused by wage-push or price-push, known
as cost-push or seller's inflation, has triggered stagflation in our economy.
P. SAMUELSON, supra, at 138, 768-770.
3. If the government attempts to reduce inflation by contraction-
ary fiscal and monetary policies, unemployment will increase while growth
and productivity decrease. If the government attempts to decrease unem-
ployment and increase growth by increasing aggregate demand through
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dropped significantly. Nevertheless, to one observer, 'infla-
tion is far from having been eliminated, even temporarily;
. . . the current inflation rate is high by standards of any ex-
tended peacetime period other than the past fifteen years." 4
Economist Gottfried Haberler has warned, "Inflation is down
but not out. It may well accelerate again when the strong dol-
lar weakens, as most experts expect."' 5 Economists also have
cautioned that if the government fails to restrict monetary
policy and control budget deficits, inflation may well increase
in the future.6 Thus, stagflation has challenged Americans to
find the "theoretical breakthrough that will help the mixed
economy cope better with this new scourge." 7
Professor Martin Weitzman, an economist at the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, has proposed a wage pay-
ment system called a "share economy," which asserts that
employment and production should increase without allowing
the development of cost-push inflation, thus conquering stag-
flation. s In a share economy, the wage system is restructured
to allow market forces to directly influence salary payments.
The employee's income is determined by allocating a per-
centage of the annual revenue or profit earned by the corpo-
ration among the workers.9 When sales drop during a reces-
sion, wages fall, thereby allowing prices to drop and sales to
be revived.1" Professor Weitzman predicts cost-push inflation
will be curtailed;1 unemployment will be decreased due to
the built-in incentive for employers to hire additional labor; 2
and production will be increased as more labor is hired, lead-
ing to a stimulation of growth as well as demand in our econ-
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, inflation will be accelerated. G.
HABERLER, supra note 2, at 9. See also, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1,
at 477. Chart No. 796 shows the decreasing rate of the Consumer Price
Index from 1980-1983 (13.5 to 3.2) and then the increasing rate in 1984
(4.3). Id.
4. Broida, Why the Inflation Outlook Is Worrisome, THE AEI ECONO-
MIST, July 1984, at 12.
5. G. HABERLER, supra note 2, at 6.
6. The Committee to Fight Inflation, Inflation Remains a Problem-
and a Threat, THE AEI ECONOMIST, March 1985, at 2.
7. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 2, at 766.
8. M. WEITZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY: CONQUERING STAGFLATION
144 (1984).
9. Id. at 101.
10. S. SPEISER, THE USOP HANDBOOK 59 (1986).
11. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 117.
12. Id. at 88.
[Vol. 2
AMERICAN SHARE ECONOMY
omy.'3 This article will analyze Professor Weitzman's share
system, evaluate the objections raised by laborers and owners,
and recommend a tax incentive plan to encourage its imple-
mentation in the current United States economy.
I. PROFESSOR WEITZMAN'S SHARE ECONOMY
A. Changes Under a Hybrid Share System
Professor Weitzman foresees a hybrid share system as
the means of implementing a share system into the American
economy. In the theoretical share system, one hundred per
cent of the wage would be determined by market forces. In a
hybrid share system, eighty to eighty-five percent of the sal-
ary would be a guaranteed base wage and fifteen to twenty
per cent would be a share wage."' This share wage would be
negotiated as a fixed percentage of profits or revenue of the
company." .A typical plan might set aside the percentage of
revenue or income from the past quarter and create a "shar-
ing fund." The fund would be divided into thirteen weeks
and the laborer would receive both his base wage and his bo-
nus payment at the end of the week. 6 Both the base wage
and the percentage amount could be renegotiated through
the bargaining process to allow labor to react to growth or
decline in the company and changing market conditions.1 7
Professor Weitzman's proposal includes a tax exemption of
fifty per cent of the laborers' share wage to induce labor to
participate in such a program. 8 It also includes the creation
of a Share Plan Agency to establish minimum requirement
guidelines for a share system. 9 For example, it would set the
minimum percentage needed for a share wage to qualify for
the tax-exemption status.20
Despite the apparent novelty of Professor Weitzman's
proposal to implement a profit sharing system into industrial
firms with traditional fixed wage systems, various forms of
profit sharing determine salaries in a number of professions.
13. Id. at 5-6.
14. The 'Share Economy': Can It Solve Our Economic Ills?, U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REP., Aug. 26, 1985, at 65.
15. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 3-5.
16. Id. at 136.
17. Id. at 104.
18. Id. at 131.
19. Id. at 134-35.
20. It would also be reasonable to speculate that such an agency
would disallow any system which would violate minimum wage laws.
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Self-employed workers, professionals, executives, salesmen
and writers all earn their salary based on a percentage of
profit earned during the year. 1 Closely related to Professor
Weitzman's hybrid share system is the shtiskin koy6 system in
Japan, in which workers receive their salary in the form of a
monthly base wage and two yearly profit-sharing bonuses.
The base wage is a negotiated amount while the bonus wage
rises or falls with the income of the company. Japanese em-
ployers have benefited from the built-in flexibility of this sys-
tem, which allows the company to reduce labor costs during
recessions without laying off workers. Japanese laborers bene-
fit by lifetime employment and excellent working conditions.
Workers also perceive themselves as permanently employed
partners which increases corporate loyalty and a positive atti-




Professor Weitzman suggests that if several firms adopt a
share system, the aggregate effect would be to cause a de-
crease in unemployment, an increase in growth, and a de-
crease in cost-push inflation, thus avoiding stagflation.2
The unique characteristics of a share economy would
stimulate demand for labor and decrease unemployment.
When an employee's wage is based on a percentage of reve-
nue or profits, the hiring of additional workers means that
profits are divided by more persons, thus lowering the bonus
payment of every employee by a fraction. As additional labor
produces more output, the price, and subsequently the profit,
will drop because the increased supply in the market will
lower demand, thus reducing the bonus payment of the pre-
viously employed laborer. This relationship creates a situa-
tion in which the marginal cost of each new laborer is lower
than the marginal cost of the last laborer. These elements re-
sult in a lower marginal cost to the firm in hiring an addi-
tional laborer than the average cost of a laborer. 4 Hence,
firms in a share economy will have a natural tendency to hire
additional workers because the marginal cost of hiring a new
21. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 72-74.
22. Id. at 74-75.
23. Id. at 144.
24. Weitzman assumes firms hire labor to the point where the mar-
ginal cost of an additional worker is equal to the marginal revenue contrib-
uted by that worker.
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worker is less than the marginal revenue produced by that
worker.2" Professor Weitzman suggests that as individual
firms hire additional laborers, these newly hired workers will
cause an increased demand for the products of other firms.
This increased demand creates a ripple effect causing other
firms to increase production and hire additional workers.26
Several economists, however, suggest that wages will not
drop;2" that the system creates an artificial demand for la-
bor;"8 and that unemployment is caused by several different
factors.29 Despite these arguments, Professor Weitzman con-
tends that firms, in aggregate, will create a " 'strong force' of
positive excess demand for labor . . . pulling it toward full
employment." 0
This increased employment could cause an increase in
growth in the economy. Newly hired workers would spend
their salaries on other products in the market, thus, increas-
ing the demand for these products and stimulating growth in
other markets.81 Furthermore, as additional labor is hired,
the quantity of goods produced would increase, causing
growth within the original markets. Thus, industry stagna-
tion could be eliminated. 2
A share system could create an environment in which
cost-push inflation could not take root." When labor de-
25. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 87-88.
26. Id.
27. Whether wages will drop has been a major source of debate be-
tween the Classical and Keynesian schools of thought for years, and history
tends to show that they will not drop. Thurow, How to Get Out of the Eco-
nomic Rut, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 14, 1985, at 9; P. SAMUELSON, supra
note 2, at 546.
28. A share economy assumes the demand will increase despite the
fact that it is splitting the same pie among more people. "Nor is it clear
why a share economy necessarily solves the Keynesian problem of inade-
quate demand." The State of the Unions, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 25, 1985,
at 26.
29. Albeit increasing demand for labor, thus stimulating jobs,
should decrease unemployment, it must be noted that several other factors
affect unemployment such as insufficient skills, increased automation, and
inability to relocate (two income families), as well as increased competition
from world market (with lower wages) and discrimination in employment.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic Justice for All: Catho-
lic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (Final Text 1986), at paras. 146-147
reprinted in 16 ORIGINS 412 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Pastoral Letter].
30. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 97.
31. Id. at 88.
32. See id. at 5-6.
33. 'he State of the Unions, supra note 28, at 26.
19871
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
mands wages (base wage plus share wage) to be pushed
higher than the competitive price of labor in that market,
more workers would be attracted to that firm. As this firm
hires additional labor, the quantity of goods produced would
increase, thus causing prices to drop as supply increases. This
price decrease would eventually reduce revenue, thus reduc-
ing the bonus payment. Professor Weitzman suggests that
such reductions will lower the artificially pushed wage rate
back to the competitive market price,34 not allowing wage-
push, and consequently price-push, to take hold. Professor
Weitzman further proposes that since prices and wages are
interrelated, labor costs are effectively indexed to price
changes. The economy as a whole is "inherently biased
against inflation because it is costly to the [individual] firms to
raise prices." 3' Professor Weitzman suggests that the share
system's ability to absorb unemployment has a significant
anti-inflationary effect because it frees the government to
deal more effectively with stabilizing the value of money. 6
Although economists correctly argue that inflation is caused
by several different factors, 7 a share system could decrease
the rise of cost-push inflation in the United States economy.
C. Secondary Effects
In addition to solving stagflation, Professor Weitzman
contends that a share system would have significant second-
ary economic implications. The degree to which a share sys-
tem would encourage these secondary benefits depends upon
the number of firms which implement this system. Neverthe-
less, the employment of more workers would have an effect
on factors such as consumption, savings, government expend-
itures, and tax revenues. Also, the production of more goods
would stimulate domestic long-term capital growth as well as
international market growth.3 8
The higher demand for labor would cause the secondary
34. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 117.
35. Weitzman, The Case for a Share Economy, CHALLENGE 34, 38
(Nov.-Dec. 1984).
36. Id.
37. Cost-push inflation caused by union wage demands constitute
only a fraction of the factors which caused inflation in the 1970s; other
factors include Asian industrial competition, international agricultural pro-
duction, prices of oil and the overvalued dollar. The State of the Unions,
supra note 28, at 26.
38. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 120-121.
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effect of increasing consumption. 9 The preyiously unem-
ployed worker would now be able to provide the basic neces-
sities for his family, such as fodd and clothing. (The purchase
of these items would create a greater demand for labor in
these markets, further stimulating consumption.) More work-
ers would also be able to purchase more expensive commodi-
ties. Studies of bonus systems in Japan have shown that be-
cause of semi-annual bonus payments, workers tend to be
able to purchase the major consumer durable items in July
and December, 0 thus stimulating more consumption. 1
Although some people use their bonus payments to
purchase necessities, others use this extra income to increase
their savings.' Further studies of the Japanese system have
shown that workers tend to consider their bonus payment as
a "buffer income." Accordingly, they tend to spend this
money with more discretion and their "marginal propensity
to consume the bonus income is significantly lower than that
of non-bonus income."'" Such results have suggested bonus
payments have a substantial positive effect on Japan's high
personal savings rate."
A share system would affect a government's revenues
and expenditures in several ways. Government expenditures
would be reduced by the decrease in unemployment pay-
ments and welfare benefits. Federal tax revenues would be
increased by the newly hired worker's payment of income
taxes. Tax revenue simultaneously would be reduced by the
proposed tax incentives.45 Based on his conclusions that a one
percentage point drop in unemployment will cover the loss of
tax revenue from the proposed tax exemptions, Professor
Weitzman suggests an overall government budget surplus
would result."
39. See id. at 88.
40. Odaka & Galenson, The Japanese Labor Market, in ASIA'S NEw Gi-
ANT 608 (H. Patrick and H. Rosovsky eds. 1976.)
41. This increase in major consumer items results from the timing
of semi-annual bonus payments; thus, such an effect may not occur if the
bonuses are paid with the weekly salary.
42. Again, if bonus payments are made as part of a weekly salary,
anticipated increases in savings may not occur.
43. Ishekawa & Ueda, The Bonus Payment System and Japanese Per-
sonal Savings, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE FIRM 134 (M.
Aoki ed. 1984).
44. Id. at 133.
45. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 131.
46. "Every extra percentage point of unemployment translates into
about $25 billion of increased federal budget deficits and about $80 billion
19871
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Finally, adoption of a share system by many companies
could increase demand for goods, stimulating both the na-
tional and international markets. A brisk demand at full ca-
pacity would increase long-term capital formation and tech-
nological growth of domestic corporations. Full employment
at home would initiate the elimination of trade barriers. In-
ternational corporations would then be able to expand their
markets and increase their foreign trade. Expanded exports
would significantly stimulate the economies of underdevel-
oped nations.4"
Therefore, according to Professor Weitzman, "the aver-
age worker, as well as the economy as a whole, is better off
under a revenue-sharing system . . . . 'I While further eco-
nomic analysis goes beyond the scope of this article, several
economists have suggested potential flaws in Professor Weitz-
man's proposal.4" Some of these criticisms include: a share
economy operates in a perfectly competitive market; 50 the
system is based on a "monopolistic competitive" model which
"has been of limited help in trying to understand the modern
corporation"; 51 and the proposal treats labor as a completely
fungible resource without considering the complex con-
tracting issues which will result.5"
II. EVALUATION OF LABOR'S OBJECTIONS
Because of the unstable economy that has marked the
'80s, labor unions have been required to accept salary cuts in
salaries and reduced benefit packages. 53 A share system
would also force laborers to forgo short-term benefits, such
as wage stability, for long term results such as increased em-
of permanently lost GNP per year." M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 131; R.
REAGAN, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Feb. 1983 at 26.
47. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 120.
48. Id. at 6.
49. See Matthews, Book Review, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE 658 (1985)
and Book Review, THE ECONOMIST 90 (June 28, 1986).
50. This perfect competition model has several underlying assump-
tions which do not occur in the real world. They include: the economy
operates in equilibrium where marginal cost equals marginal revenue; a
firm operates at maximum eficiency; a firm has no other variable costs; a
firm makes decisions based on perfect knowledge; and a firm has only two
alternatives in a recession, to go out of business or to cut costs by firing
laborers.
51. Williamson, Book Review, 95 YALE L.J. 627, 630 (1986).
52. Id. at 631-634.
53. See Shifrin, Eastern Employees Refine Details of Ownership Pact,
AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY 31-32 (Dec. 19, 1983).
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ployment. Laborers have legitimate objections to the acces-
sions required by a share system. First, laborers may object to
the potential decrease in wages and the instability of their
wage payments. However, since a share system should create
more jobs, this instability should be balanced by increased job
security. Second, labor does not want salaries to be deter-
mined by competitive forces, because if market pressures are
allowed to influence wage payments, workers who try to in-
crease their salaries to meet inflationary expectations should
not be able to push wages above the competitive level, and
thus wage-push or cost-push inflation would be curtailed.
Third, labor objects to sharing in the risks of the company
without sharing in the decision-making process. Their role in
decision-making must be limited because they would not sup-
port the hiring of additional workers which would reduce
their salaries. To properly analyze an American share system,
however, labor's interests must be carefully evaluated.
A. Wage Instability vs. Job Security
Laborers object to the instability of wages in a share
economy, particularly the potential wage loss, because it
reduces a worker's ability to provide for his family's needs
and his expectation of earning a fair wage, as well as other
motivations derived from a raise in salary. First, workers re-
quire a certain wage payment to meet the needs of their fam-
ilies. As the cost of living rises each year, workers need sala-
ries which reflect the increased cost of providing the basic
necessities of food, clothing and shelter. Second, a worker ex-
pects his wage, at a minimum, to stay constant, if not to rise
with the cost of living. If salaries are reduced, workers will
become disappointed, if not angry, at the unfairness of a sys-
tem over which they have no control. Many workers are mo-
tivated by an employer's recognition of high quality work
that is reflected in a raise in income. A system which deter-
mines salaries on factors other than workers' performance
might not only eliminate the motivational factors derived
from salaries, but also create discontent by the perceived no-
tion that their efforts go unnoticed.
Labor also objects to the increased uncertainty of wages
created by a share system. This uncertainty produces anxiety
over the ability to plan for the future. It restricts a worker's
ability to take on long-term investments such as the purchase
of a home or establishment of a college fund. Such a system
decreases the worker's ability to plan these endeavors with
19871
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any assurance that he or she will be able to meet the monthly
financial commitments over a long period of time.
Despite the disadvantages of potential wage losses, work-
ers in several industries have already been forced to accept
contracts with wage reductions."' These contracts do not as-
sure job security in the future. However, if many firms imple-
ment a share system, labor's loss of stability in wage payments
should be counterbalanced by its increase in job security. The
diminished lack of certainty in exact wage payments should
be countered by the increased certainty of long-term wages
from guaranteed employment throughout a share economy.
Professor Weitzman foresees job security for workers "be-
cause a share firm de facto offers lifetime employment, and
even if a job should be lost or a worker wishes to transfer,
another job can be found relatively easily in a share econ-
omy." 5 Professor Weitzman cites the example of The Lin-
coln Electric Company (the world's largest manufacturer of
arc-welding equipment) for its successful use of a bonus pay-
ment plan and its guaranteed employment program. Its suc-
cess is proven because no one has been laid off since the pro-
gram was initiated over thirty years ago.56 General Motor's
Saturn Project illustrates another firm where workers will
give up wage certainty for job security. Laborers have
switched from an hourly wage system to a salary based on
eighty per cent of the average industry pay plus extra pay-
ments if they meet productivity, profitability and production
goals. In return, "Saturn will guarantee lifetime employment
to eighty per cent of its work force, unless 'severe economic
conditions' or 'catastrophic events' occur. ' 57 Furthermore, in
1982 and 1984, the UAW adopted employment security as
their highest bargaining priority.58 Professor Weitzman's pre-
diction of full employment and guaranteed job security for all
laborers under a share system could offset the resulting wage
instability.
54. Id.
55. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 120.
56. Id. at 81-82.
57. Edid, A New Labor Era May Dawn at GM's Saturn, Bus. WEEK 65-
66 (July 22, 1985).




B. Competitive Wages vs. Cost-Push Inflation
Labor unions object to wages being put back into compe-
tition.59 This change could subject wages to the pressures
which force salaries to decrease to a level at which supply for
labor equals the demand for labor. Unions have worked, in
the past 100 years, to standardize contracts and to require
equal wages within an industry.6" Unions contend this change
"is good not only for workers, who avoid being played off
against each other; it is also good for the economy because it
rewards productive firms and punishes unproductive ones."61
They explain that unproductive firms are rewarded in a com-
petitive wage market because these firms can inefficiently use
their resources and then take pay cuts from their employees
to produce a profit."
Although labor correctly predicts that an unrestricted
determination of wages by market pressures could reduce sal-
aries below an acceptable standard of living, such a situation
need not occur in a share system. Under Professor Weitz-
man's proposed hybrid system, only fifteen to twenty per cent
of wages would be determined by market influences. He be-
lieves a share percentage within that range would be enough
to stimulate the economic activity necessary to eliminate stag-
flation.63 Thus, more than eighty per cent of a worker's sal-
ary would be untouched by market pressures, and this base
wage would not be lower than the minimum wage for an ac-
ceptable standard of living.
Furthermore, allowing wages to be determined by the
competitive market might stimulate Third World economies
more effectively than vast amounts of foreign aid. Haberler
has stated that, "unions in such industries as steel and auto-
mobiles have managed to keep wages about fifty per cent
above the average wage in U.S. manufacturing industries.""
He claims that, "this has been possible because these indus-
tries have been protected from foreign competition."65 By
putting wages into the competitive market, American prod-
59. Kuttner, Blue-Collar Boardrooms, THE NEw REPUBLIC 18, 23
(June 17, 1985).
60. The State of the Unions, supra note 28, at 26.
61. Id. at 27.
62. Id.
63. The 'Share Economy': Can It.Solve Our Economic Ills?, supra note
14, at 65.
64. G. HABERLER, supra note 2, at 7.
65. Id.
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ucts should be able to compete better on the international
level."8 Professor Weitzman suggests this ability to compete
will allow us to eliminate protectionist measures.6 7 Tariffs,
import quotas and exchange controls hamper free trade68
and the ability of less developed countries to expand their
markets. Less developed countries depend upon the ex-
panded American market to exchange their products for nec-
essary goods and services.69 The ability to eliminate trade re-
strictions between Third World nations and the United
States would allow the United States to help developing
countries "improve the quality of their lives and ensure that
the benefits of economic growth are shared equitably"
among them."0 Thus, increased international trade can be
mutually beneficial to both the United States and less devel-
oped countries."
If wages are placed in competition and market pressures
are allowed to influence wage payments, the growth of cost-
push inflation in the economy should be restricted. In a share
system, if labor artificially pushes wages above the market
price for that industry, more laborers could be hired at that
firm; the bonus payment would be reduced until the wage
falls back to the industry rate at which time less labor will
seek a job at that firm. Thus, a share system would limit la-
bor's ability to create an artificial wage rate. 2 Followers of
John Kenneth Galbraith would suggest solving creeping wage
inflation by imposing wage and price controls," and thereby
66. Others suggest concentrating on our own front yard through
"wage-led productivity growth" will be a better strategy to promote de-
creased dependence on the global economy and increased international co-
operation. They argue this growth would be achieved without workers hav-
ing to accept lower wages. These goals would be accomplished through
"creation of public-jobs program, labor-law reform to reduce barriers to
unionization, a substantial increase in the minimum wage and legislation to
require equal pay for jobs of comparable worth." Gordon, Do We Need To
Be No. I?, THE ATLANTA MONTHLY 100, 104 (April 1986).
67. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 120.
68. G. HABERLER, supra note 2, at 67.
69. LAY COMMISSION ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S.
ECONOMY, TOWARD THE FUTURE: CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE U.S.
ECONOMY 72 (1984). [hereinafter cited as LAY LETTER].
70. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, para. 292.
71. However, "a good society must not allow its own general gains
to be won at extreme cost to a few." New policies must be established to
protect workers who may be most vulnerable to industry-wide change. LAY
LETTER, supra note 69, at 69-76.
72. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 108.
73. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 2, at 768.
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reducing individuals' expectations. A share economy should
not permit individuals' expectations to push wages above the
market rate. A share system should also reduce a firm's de-
sire to raise prices, since it would lead to a simultaneous in-
crease in their labor cost. Thus, a reduction of artificial wage
increases and a reduction in price increases would chill the
growth of cost-push inflation. 4
Many individuals would benefit from a reduction of cost-
push inflation since it creates many adverse effects in our so-
ciety. First, it reduces the "real value" of money, thus requir-
ing more dollars to buy the same product." This loss dispro-
portionately falls upon the poor and the working class
because much of their income is spent on the purchase of
four basic necessities: food, energy, shelter and health care.
The annual inflation rate for necessities between 1970 and
1977 was one and a half times as high as the rate for non-
necessities." Hence, people on fixed incomes are severely af-
fected by inflation, since their ability to buy necessities is
greatly reduced." Similiarly, the elderly within the lower to
middle income brackets often are adversely affected because
they depend heavily on fixed income from property interests
and fixed social security benefits.78
Second, inflation reduces the value of savings since an in-
dividual's dollar has less value in the future than it does at
the present time. A reduction in the ability to save causes
people to lose a measure of control over their lives. They are
unable to build college or retirement funds which will suffi-
ciently cover these future expenses.7
Third, inflation creates an unstable income structure.80
The inability to save and an unstable salary only serve to in-
crease anxiety about the prospects for the future.81 There-
74. Weitzman, supra note 35, at 38.
75. A. BURNS, How INFLATION INFLUENCES OUR LivEs 1 (American
Enterprise Institute Reprint No. 113, June 1980).
76. Nulty, How Inflation Hits the Majority, CHALLENGE 32, 34 (Jan.-
Feb. 1979).
77. Despite the fact that labor's wage demand have been cited as a
major contributor to causing wage-push inflation, (G. HABERLER, supra note
2, at 5.) the reader should be aware that restricting labor's ability to in-
crease their income may force their salaries to become similiar to a fixed
salary.
78. Minarik, Who Wins, Who Loses from Inflation? CHALLENGE 26, 30-
31 (Jan.-Feb. 1979).
79. A. BURNS, supra note 75, at 2.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 2.
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fore, "by causing disillusionment and breeding discontent, in-
flation .. .(increases) doubt among people about themselves,
about the competence of their government and about the
free enterprise system itself."
82
Many corporations also would benefit from the reduction
of cost-push inflation in our economy. As in the case of indi-
viduals, a corporations' "real value" of money is reduced and
their value of savings is lessened. In addition, corporations
face the substantial problem of erratic price changes caused
by inflation. These changes affect the firm's ability to predict
long-term profits and thus restricts long-term capital invest-
ment.8" Such flucuations also inhibit long-run risk taking.84
Without these investments, corporate growth is severely lim-
ited. In sum, the reduction of cost-push inflation would im-
prove the quality of life for many sectors of our society.
C. Participative Management vs. Unemployment
The third objection to the share economy is that labor-
ers would be expected to share in the risk of the company
without receiving a share in the decision-making process.
Since a worker's salary would correlate to the profits of the
company, the amount of an employee's paycheck would di-
rectly relate to the successful operation of the firm. Thus,
employees would be sharing more fully in the risks inherent
in ownership. Laborers object to this apparent shifting of risk
without receiving the ability to influence decisions which de-
termine the success of the company. Professor Weitzman ar-
gues that a share system only reallocates the risks among all
laborers instead of allocating it only to workers with the low-
est seniority who will be the first to lose their jobs. 85 Never-
theless, a form of participative management would give work-
ers a means to contribute their ideas into the decision-making
process. Professor Weitzman suggests, however, that there is
an inherent problem with a participative type of management
in a share system.8 The ability to decrease unemployment, a
82. A. BURNS, INFLATION MUST BE STOPPED 2 (American Enterprise
Institute Reprint No. 99, June 1979).
83. Id. at 5.
84. Minarik, supra note 78, at 26.
85. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 140. In a wage system, when de-
mand decreases, the last hired workers will once again become unem-
ployed. Thus, they shoulder the risk for all employees, while the high-se-
niority workers do not share any of the risk.
86. Id. at 133.
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primary goal of a share system, can only occur when the firm
is allowed to hire significant numbers of new workers. But
when a new worker is hired, the presently employed laborer
takes a wage loss because he receives a smaller share of the
profits. Thus, it is intrinsically against the employee's inter-
ests for the firm to continuously hire additional workers."7
Since it is feared that the implementation of participative
management would endanger the firm's ability to decrease
unemployment, the benefits of increased participative man-
agement must be balanced with the benefits of reduced
unemployment.
Implementing a participative management system could
create a more conducive work environment, and, in general,
a healthier workforce. Studies evaluating profit sharing pro-
grams have been shown participation improves morale, coop-
eration, and loyalty within the firm, allowing the company to
attract and retain better workers, reducing employee turno-
ver and absenteeism. 88 Conversely, programs which lack an
effective means of participation have shown to be less effi-
cient plans, causing workers to feel disappointment, hostility
and cynicism. 89 Moreover, it has been suggested that partici-
pation "yields good results: prosperity, security, peace and in-
dividual morality." 90 Such results have been attributed to an
employee's increased interest in working hard for a common
goal. This increased democracy in the workplace has contrib-
uted to a decrease in an individual's self-interest and an in-
crease in the interest of the general good of the community
creating "a body of active concerned public-spirited citi-
zens." In 1986, the American Bishops in Justice for All:
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy suggested
"[s]ocial justice implies that persons have an obligation to be
87. Other methods of participation can be designed to limit em-
ployee's input on hiring decisions, but still provide an effective voice for
labor within the firm. Alternatively, share system stock ownership plans
give employees an equity interest in their firm with full voting rights.
Thus, as individuals, they are receiving ownership interests which compen-
sates for the perceived increase in risk and in aggregate, they can elect
directors to the Board to represent their interests in the company's
operation.
88. B. METZGER, PROFIT SHARING IN PERSPECTIVE IN AMERICAN ME-
DIUM-SIZED AND SMALL BUSINESS 119-129 (1966).
89. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, EMPLOYEE OWNER-
SHIP-A READER 46 (1985).
90. R. MCKENZIE, JUSTICE AS PARTICIPATION: SHOULD WORKERS BE
GIVEN MANAGERIAL RIGHTS? 5 (1985).
91. Id. at 31.
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active and productive participants in the life of society and
that society has a duty to enable them to participate in this
way."' 2 The Bishops further stressed the duty "to organize
economic . . . institutions so that people can contribute to
society in ways that respect their freedom and the dignity of
their labor."9 Thus, through participative management, la-
bor is given the opportunity to contribute to the decisions in
their firms and effectively influence the economic institutions
which shape their lives.
These benefits must be balanced by the benefits of re-
duced unemployment. In the pastoral letter, the American
Bishops declared that full employment should be the primary
goal."4 In 1931, addressing a world beset with economic
problems, Pope Pius XI warned:
Unemployment . . . especially as we see it prolonged and
injuring so many . . . has plunged workers into misery and
temptations, ruined the prosperity of nations, and put in
jeopardy the public order, peace and tranquility of the
whole world.
95
Increased employment can significantly decrease the emo-
tional effects on these individuals, decrease poverty and dis-
crimination in our society and improve working conditions in
corporations. 6
The emotional effects of unemployment have shattered
the individual, the family and American society. Unemployed
individuals experience a serious loss of self respect as well as
strong guilt, believing society blames them for not having a
job.17 They suffer overwhelming stress, and this pressure has
been correlated to increased mental illnesses and increased
suicides. 98 The unemployed experience this deep loss of self
respect because work corresponds with dignity; it is through
work that dignity is expressed and increased. Work provides
the opportunity for fulfillment as a human being.99 "Employ-
92. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 71.
93. Id. at para. 72.
94. Id. at para. 155.
95. Pius XI, On Reconstruction of the Social Order (Quadragesimo Anno)
no. 74 (1931).
96. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 120.
97. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 141.
98. Id.
99. John Paul II, On Human Work (Laborem Exercens) no. 9 (1981).
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ment is crucial to self-realization and essential to the fulfill-
ment of material needs."1 0
The sense of inadequacy which results from a worker's
inability to provide for the material needs of his or her family
has contributed to the breakdown of the family. 1 ' In 1982,
Pope John Paul II, perceiving the probable displacement of
skilled workers because of vast technological innovations, ex-
plained in Laborem Exercens that "work constitutes a founda-
tion for the formation of family life."'0 2 It isthrough the
family that the "reference for shaping the social and ethical
order of human work" is affirmed.' Thus, children learn
the value and fulfillment of work by the role model of their
parents. Lack of employment limits the parent's ability to in-
still the ethical value of work in their children. It can also
limit the parents' ability to educate their children.0 4 The
stress created by unemployment has been known to cause
family quarrels and excessive drinking. This pressure has
been released in destructive ways causing increases in spouse
and child abuse, even leading to deaths. Unemployment has
contributed to the rising divorce rate and the number of sin-
gle-parent families.0 5
Moreover, Pope John Paul II asserts that man through
work "combines his deepest human identity with membership
of a nation, and intends his work also to increase the com-
mon good. . . ."101 An individuals inability to work erodes
the common welfare. "Business, schools and local govern-
ments lose their economic support base . . . .Churches and
social agencies no longer have the resources to meet escalat-
ing family and personal problems. Unemployed youth be-
come a threat, not a resource. "107 Joblessness has been linked
with crime, particularly to an increse in homicides, robberies,
larcenies, narcotics arrests and youth arrests. An increase in
crime results in an increased prison population.10 8 Thus, it is
clear that individuals, families and society are paying a high
cost for unemployment.
The level of poverty, which has risen dramatically during
100. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 137.
101. Id. at para. 141.
102. John Paul II, supra note 99, at no. 1 and no. 10.
103. Id. at no. 10.
104. Id.
105. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 141.
106. John Paul II, supra note 99, at no. 10.
107. R. McKENZIE, supra note 90, at 31.
108. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 142.
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the last decade,'0 9 could be reduced by increasing employ-
ment;11 thereby reducing the psychological effects on indi-
viduals and more specifically the effects on the mental and
physical development of children."' Poverty destroys human
dignity and self-reliance."' It creates feelings of helplessness,
dependency and inferiority. Many poor feel unable to influ-
ence decisions that affect their lives and are not oriented to-
wards the future."' Poor children have not only been found
to be psychologically scarred but also physically undernour-
ished."" Statistically, "one out of every four American chil-
dren under the age of six and one in every two black children
under six are poor. The [aggregate] number of children in
poverty rose by four million over the decade between 1973-
1983. .... ,II Many poor do not have medical insurance and
"less than half are immunized against preventable diseases
such as diphtheria and polio."" 6 Furthermore, the poor are
denied full participation in the economic, social and political
life of society."' For these reasons, the American Bishops
have urged "the first line of attack against poverty must be to
build and sustain a healthy economy that provides employ-
ment opportunities. . . .Poverty is intimately linked to the
issue of employment."" i
8
Past discrimination has excluded minorities from the
mainstream of American life. Such obstacles need to be elimi-
nated so minorities can improve their economic status" 9 and
109. "Since 1973 the poverty rate has increased by nearly a third."
Id. at para. 171.
110. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 120.
111. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 172.
112. Id. at para. 196.
113. Id. at para. 188.
114. Id. at para. 172.
115. Id. at para. 176.
116. Id. at para. 177.
117. Id. at para. 188.
118. Id. at para. 196. Mainstream poverty, specifically should be in-
fluenced by increased job opportunities. Sociologists describe three kinds
of poverty: mainstream poverty, the temporary poor whose primary bread-
winner is temporarily out of work; case poverty, the permanent poor who
may be physically disabled, mentally disturbed, alcoholic or chronically ill;
and social poverty, the urban underclass who may be functionally illiterate,
two time offenders or undocumented aliens. Increased employment efforts
will most specifically benefit the mainstream poor, but other types of social
programs may be necessary to decrease case. poverty and social poverty.
Speech given by Ed Marciniak, President of the Institute of Urban Life
(March 28, 1985) reprinted in 14 ORIGINs 724, 726 (1985).
119. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 182.
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partake more actively in the opportunities of our society. Dis-
crimination should be decreased if there is a greater demand
for labor than the supply, as the economy moves towards full
employment. Prejudices unrelated to productivity should be
eliminated despite their deep roots because one's desire to
make a profit can also be deep-rooted.120
In addition, increased employment caused by an excess
demand for labor should create better working conditions for
employees. In a share economy, workers would become
scarce and employers would compete for the scarce supply by
utilizing innovative recruitment techniques, offering training
programs and creating a better work atmosphere."' Employ-
ees may experience a more positive work environment, re-
flected in increased cooperation and corporate loyalty, such
as that found in both traditional American profit-sharing
firms and Japanese bonus systems.'
The emotional effects of unemployment on the individ-
ual, the family and American society have been devastating.
Persistent levels of high unemployment during the last dec-
ade have been a major reason why poverty has increased in
recent years.'2 3 High unemployment has given firms little in-
centive to decrease discrimination or improve working condi-
tions. To summarize, the American Bishops have recently
explained:
We cannot afford the economic costs, the social dislocation
and the enormous human tragedies, caused by unemploy-
ment. In the end, however, what we can least afford is the
assault on human dignity that occurs when millions are left
without adequate employment. Therefore, we cannot but
conclude that current levels of unemployment are morally
unacceptable.
24
120. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 121-122. (However, even if em-
ployment discrimination is reduced, it may still influence corporate deci-
sions such as the amount of a raise or the fringe benefit package.)
121. Id. at 120.
122. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., SHARING PROFITS
WITH EMPLOYEES 12 (1957); Okuno, Corporate Loyalty and Bonus Payments:
An Analysis of Work Incentives in Japan, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
JAPANESE FIRM 406 (M. Aoki ed. 1984).
123. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 196.
124. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Social Teach-
ing and the U.S. Economy (Second Draft,) para. 142 reprinted in 15 ORIGINS
257, 272 (1985).
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III. EVALUATION OF OWNERS' OBJECTION:
Divestment of Ownership Interests vs. Economic
Development
Owners object to the divestment of their ownership in-
terest through the employees' ability to share in the profits of
the company. This divestment must be balanced, however, by
the increase in growth of their own company and of the over-
all economy. In a year of high profits, an employee's base
wage and increased share wage may be higher than a salary
under the fixed wage system, but in a year of low profits, an
employee's share system wage may be lower than a fixed
wage.
In either case, the owners will be divesting part of this
ownership interest. Owners have invested their capital into
the firm in exchange for a right to ownership interests. In a
share system, owners are asked to relinquish a share of the
benefits which they rightfully own. In 1891, Pope Leo XIII
addressed the need for private ownership in Rerum Novarum.
He explained that when a man labors, he acquires a right to
renumeration but also to the disposal of that renumeration.
He elaborated on this there by stating:
if [a man] lives sparingly, saves his money, and for greater
security, invests his savings in land, the land, in such case, is
only his wages under another form; and consequently, a
working man's little estate thus purchased should be as
completely at his full disposal as are the wages he receives
for his labor.
125
Although owners have the right to receive the fruits of
their investment, many have suggested the right to private
ownership should be qualified.
12 6
While recognizing the rights of the individual and the
need to provide for one's family, some theorists argue that
we must appreciate the needs of the whole community, and
that the limited goods available must be shared to provide
basic necessities for all members of the community. 27 This
argument has recently been expressed by the American Bish-
ops in 1986 as they addressed the increasingly complex eco-
nomic situation facing the United States: "the common good
125. Leo XIII, In Capital and Labor (Rerum Novarum) no. 5 (1891).
126. See John Paul II, supra note 99, at no. 14; Paul VI, On the Devel-
opment of Peoples (Popularum Progressio) no. 48 (1963); Pius XI, supra note
95, at nos. 44-50; Leo XIII, supra note 125, at no. 22, 34.
127. Pius XI, supra note 95, at no. 45.
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may sometimes demand that the right to own be limited by
public involvement in the planning or ownership of certain
sectors of the economy . . . .No one is justified in keeping
for his exclusive use what he does not need, when others lack
necessities."
12 8
The divestment of ownership interests should be bal-
anced by the economic development of the firm and society
as a whole. The company should benefit by increased flexibil-
ity in the wage system and increased growth in production. 12 9
First, a flexible wage system provides for shifts in the individ-
ual firm's market as well as in the overall economy. This flex-
ibility allows the firm to react to such shifts without requiring
employee lay-offs or renegotiated contracts. This flexibility
would decrease the administration and training costs associ-
ated with a constantly changing workforce. Secondly, a share
wage system would increase an individual firm's production.
As the demand for the product increases, the firm would pro-
duce more goods. This increased growth would generate
more income and profit for the company, thus, despite the
divestment of interests, each owner could potentially receive
more benefits.
A share system would promote an overall healthier eco-
nomic development which could benefit all members of soci-
ety. Under a share system, more workers could enjoy the
benefits of employment, and the society as a whole would en-
joy the benefits of decreased inflation, a steady dollar, in-
creased growth and production, and the conquering of stag-
flation."30 The American Bishops have emphasized the need
for labor and management to work together in a partnership,
with creative initiative and a willingness to cooperate on all
sides. 1 1 With this spirit of cooperation, it is hoped owners
and workers can overcome their objections to expand the
sharing of economic power and relate the economic system
more accountably to the common good. 32
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the potential benefits to labor, owners and soci-
ety, widespread implementation of share systems cannot be
128. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 115.
129. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 5.
130. Id. at 144.
131. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 302.
132. Id. at para. 297.
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expected"'3 without further incentives. s4 If an individual
firm is considering a share system, the increased wage flexi-
bility should give owners sufficient incentive to implement a
share system.135 Labor, however, will also need an incentive
to stimulate a willingness to risk a potential wage loss and a
certain wage amount in an uncertain economy. Professor
Weitzman proposes that employees receive a tax exemption
of approximately fifty percent of the bonus payment.' 6 The
federal government would be encouraging a share system by
effectively increasing employees' take-home pay. 1'
An alternative would be for the company to provide an
incentive in the form of shares of stock. A share system stock
option may be preferable because it would reflect current tax
policy goals; it would constitute a more efficient tax expendi-
ture; and it would provide greater benefits to both the firm
and the employee. A share system stock option would be sim-
ilar to the current leveraged employee stock ownership plans.
The firm would establish a share system stock option trust to
hold assets, and this trust would borrow money to buy shares
of stock from the firm. The firm would then contribute
money to the trust which would be used to pay off the
loan." 8 The firm would get a deduction for the amount con-
tributed to the trust, but these contributions could not ex-
ceed the total wages paid in bonus payments. The firm would
receive a tax deduction on all dividends paid on these shares,
thus reducing the effect of the corporation's double taxation.
The bank also would receive a fifty percent deduction in the
amount of interest received." 9 Under a share system stock
option, the employees would receive shares of stock in pro-
portion to the amount of their bonus payments. These shares
133. Williamson, supra note 51, at 628.
134. Tax analysts will argue that if a share system will significantly
benefit these groups, then they will implement a system because of these
implicit advantages. The success of the Japanese sh6shin koy6 system ex-
emplifies this point. Thus, they question the need for a tax incentive plan.
Tax specialists also suggest the use of tax incentives is inconsistent with a
share system's general premise of removing obstacles which limit free flow
within the market.
135. See M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 112.
136. Id. at 131.
137. The increase would be in the amount of fifty percent of their
bonus wage times the appropriate tax rate.
138. THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN: THE
CONCEPT.
139. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-551 (1986)
[hereinafter referred to as CONFERENCE REPORT].
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would accumulate in the trust until the employee separates
from the firm, at which time, if there is no readily tradeable
market, the firm would be required to offer the employee a
temporary "put" option. The trust would retain only nomi-
nal ownership of the securities, however. A significant factor
in the share system ownership plan, unlike the employee
stock ownership plan, would be that employees would imme-
diately receive substantial incidents of ownership. They
would acquire the right to receive dividends and the right to
vote without needing to meet any vesting requirements.14
Because of their participation in a bonus wage system, they
would become actual shareholders in the company.
A share system stock option would promote current tax
policy goals. Throughout the current tax reform efforts, the
Reagan administration has stressed several goals, including
economic neutrality, lower rates of tax, revenue neutrality,
fairness for families, simplification and a fair and orderly
transition. 1" Economic neutrality, one of these primary
goals, encourages the free market system by allowing "mar-
ket forces to lead business firms to produce what consumers
want in ways that are relatively efficient and economical.'
' 42
The administration promotes economic neutrality by requir-
ing all income to be taxed equally, so one person, firm, in-
vestment or use of income is not favored over another. 43 In
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 this policy fostered the elimina-
tion of both the investment tax credit 144 and the employee
stock ownership tax credit (PAYSOP)14 because they dispro-
portionately favored one use of income over another.
Similiarly, the tax credit proposed by Professor Weitzman
disproportionately favors one form of income over another.
Since Professor Weitzman's tax credit fails to promote eco-
nomic neutrality, a primary goal of the current tax reform
efforts, such an incentive system will probably lack the sup-
140. Giving immediate voting rights to employees will not affect the
firm's decisions to hire additional labor (an essential factor in a share sys-
tem) because management makes the hiring decisions not the shareholders.
141. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 13-20 (November 1984).
142. Id. at 13.
143. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE ADMINISTRATION'S 1985
TAX PROPOSALS 60 (1985).
144. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, S.Rpt. No.
99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1986); see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTI-
TUTE, supra note 143, at 60.
145. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 144, at 679; see AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 143, at 60.
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port necessary to implement the program.
On the other hand, leveraged employee stock ownership
plans have been encouraged by Congress as well as by the
Administration. ESOPs have received strong support from
the Senate whose version of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
contained the following statement of Congressional Policy:
The Congress . . . has reflected its interest in encouraging
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) as a bold and in-
novative technique of corporate finance for purposes of
strengthening the private free enterprise system ...
[T]he Congress [intends that such plans] be used in a wide
variety of corporate financing transactions in order to en-
courage the participation of employees as beneficiaries of
such transactions.
'"1 4
Although this statement was not adopted by the Conference
Committee, a similar provision was retained from the Tax
Reform Act of 1976.147 Moreover, the Committee expanded
some important tax incentives, such as the dividends paid de-
duction and the interest income exclusion. 14' Additionally,
the share system stock option contains many characteristics
stressed in the Administration's proposal to defer the tradi-
tional incidents of ownership in employee stock ownership
plans. 49 Under a share system stock option, these incidents
of ownership vest immediately, thus fulfilling the Administra-
tion's goal of more effectively encouraging employee
ownership.
A share system stock option would constitute a more effi-
cient tax expenditure than Professor Weitzman's proposed
tax credit. Tax expenditures represent losses of revenue
which can be attributed to federal tax law provisions such as
tax exemptions, deductions or credits. 5' Despite the diffi-
culty of measuring these expenditures,15 1 the estimated reve-
nue loss of Professor Weitzman's tax credit and of a share
system stock option deduction can be compared to determine
146. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 144, at 677.
147. The ESOP Association, Comparison of Present Law, House Tax
Reform Bill and Senate Finance Committee Bill-ESOP Provisions 8-3.
148. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 139, at 11-557, 558 & 559.
149. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: TAX TREAT-
MENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS 23 (ESOPs) (JCS-42-85), (Sept.
20, 1985).
150. Ture, 13 TAX NOTES 1535, 1536 (1981).
151. Id. at 1538-1539.
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the most efficient incentive plan."' Under Professor Weitz-
man's plan, the federal government would completely finance
the incentive by providing a tax credit in the amount of fifty
percent of the bonus payment. Professor Weitzman hypothe-
sizes that if twenty-five million workers take one half of their
pay as share income and each worker earns $17,000, then,
under this proposed system each worker would save $1,000
in taxes and the federal government would lose $25 billion
per year in tax revenues. 53 Under a share system stock op-
tion, the firm would finance the majority of the incentive
plan. Government tax expenditures for the share system
stock plan would be similar to the expenditures for the lever-
aged employee stock ownership plan. For the period of 1977-
1983, leveraged ESOPs accounted for less than one billion
dollars in lost revenue.1 5' Despite the fact that these numbers
are estimates, such analysis shows that a share system stock
option would result in a much smaller tax expenditure.
A share system stock option offers many advantages to
both the firm and the employees. In addition to the benefits
attributable to a share system, the firm would specifically gain
from a stock ownership plan. A trust fund allows a corpora-
tion to raise new capital or to refinance existing debt with
pretax dollars. Such financing can prevent a company from
going public or facilitating an employee buy out. 55 These
stock options facilitate selling stock by creating a ready mar-
ket for their shares. Cooperation between labor and manage-
ment should increase, thus influencing motivation and
productivity. 5 '
Employees will benefit significantly from a share system
stock option. With Professor Weitzman's proposed tax credit,
the employee would receive a single tax reduction. With a
share system stock option, the employee would receive a
stream of payments. Employees would be receiving much
more than the immediate cash; they would be building an eq-
uity interest in the company. In the past twenty years, the
concentration of wealth in the super-rich has increased signif-
152. See generally, Davenport, I I TAX NOTES 1051-1054 (1980).
153. M. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 153.
154. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS, INTERIM REPORT ON A SURVEY AND RELATED ECONOMIC TRENDS 43
(Feb. 1986).
155. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, BROADENING THE OWNERSHIP OF
NEW CAPITAL: ESOPs AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 32-
33 (Comm. Print 1976).
156. Id. at 34. "
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icantly. The top ten percent of American households own
more than seventy percent of the nation's wealth not other-
wise owned by governments or private organizations. 5" In
the past ten years, stock ownership plans have distributed
substantial amounts of corporate stock to workers who might
never have been able to accumulate an equity interest." In
1981, Pope John Paul II in Laborem Exercens expressed strong
support for proposals which associate labor with the owner-
ship of capital. 15'This redistribution of wealth has been pro-
moted throughout social teachings in the past century. In
1891, Pope Leo XIII, aware of the struggles of laborers, dis-
cussed the value of employee ownership:
Men always work harder and more readily when they work
on that which belongs to them; nay, they learn to love the
very soil that yields in response to the labor of their hands,
not only food to eat, but an abundance of good things for
themselves and those who are dear to them. That such a
spirit of willing labor would add to the produce of the earth
and to the wealth of the community is self-evident.160
Thus, employees would substantially benefit from a share sys-
tem stock option and it may provide the necessary incentive
to encourage employees to bargain for a share system.
CONCLUSION
Stagflation has defied economists in the 1980s. A share
economy offers a realistic solution to this troubling combina-
tion of unemployment, inflation and stagnation. Moreover, a
share system stock option could provide the incentive needed
to encourage owners and especially laborers to implement a
share system. "The challenge of today is to move beyond ab-
stract disputes . . .to consideration of creative ways of ena-
bling government and private groups to work together effec-
tively."' 61 An American share economy could be the answer
to that challenge.
157. Employee Stock Ownership Assoc. of America, "New Studies
Show Increased Concentration of Ownership of U.S. Wealth", The ESOP
Report, July 1986, at 1.
158. Id.
159. John Paul II, supra note 99, at no. 14.
160. Leo XIII, supra note 125, at no. 47.
161. Pastoral Letter, supra note 29, at para. 314.
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